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ASSESSING THE EFFECTS OF A “LOSER 
PAYS” RULE ON THE AMERICAN LEGAL 
SYSTEM: AN ECONOMIC ANALYSIS AND 
PROPOSAL FOR REFORMτ
 
 
Marie Gryphon*
 
 
Although the American justice system is derided as 
expensive, capricious, and prone to abuse, Americans go to 
court more often—and more expensively—than any other people 
in the world.1
                                                   
τ An early version of this research appeared as Marie Gryphon, Civil Justice 
Report 11, Greater Justice, Lower Cost: How a “Loser pays” Rule Would 
Improve the American Legal System, Civil Justice Report 11, MANHATTAN INST. 
FOR POL’Y RES. (Dec. 2008), http://www.manhattan-
institute.org/html/cjr_11.htm. Thanks are due to the Manhattan Institute for 
permission to revise this early work. 
  The purpose of this paper is to explore the 
possibility of reducing the incidence of what I will call “abusive 
litigation” in the United States by replacing the so-called 
“American rule” requiring each party to a lawsuit to pay her own 
attorneys, win or lose, with a “loser pays rule,” according to 
which the losing party to a civil suit must pay the winner’s 
reasonably incurred legal fees.  Loser pays is the default rule for 
* Olin-Searle Fellow in Law, Harvard Law School; Adjunct Fellow, 
Manhattan Institute Center for Legal Policy; B.A., University of Washington; 
J.D., University of Washington School of law; Ph.D. candidate in public policy, 
Harvard University. 
1 See TOWERS PERRIN TILLINGHAST, U.S. TORT COSTS AND CROSS-BORDER 
PERSPECTIVES: 2005 UPDATE 4 (2005), available at  
http://www.towersperrin.com/tillinghast/publications/reports/2005_Tort_Co
st/2005_Tort.pdf. 
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payment of attorney’s fees in the vast majority of foreign legal 
systems. 2
While all litigation is costly, litigation of meritorious claims 
is sometimes necessary in order to compensate damaged victims 
or parties to broken contracts.  Abusive litigation, by definition, 
is not even close to being legally meritorious.
 
3
The American rule also makes most legal victories Pyrrhic 
ones. As Professor Jon Langbein told ABC’s John Stossel, 
“When you win, you lose under our system. I win, I defeat your 
claim . . . but it has cost me tens, hundreds of thousands, 
sometimes millions of dollars.  I have a victory that has brought 
me to the poorhouse.”
  Rather, it is 
pursued by a plaintiff or attorney who has good reason to believe 
that she is legally in the wrong, but who sues anyway in order to 
exact revenge or coerce a settlement from the lawsuit’s target.  
The American rule makes the civil justice system as a whole 
unnecessarily costly by encouraging the filing of such lawsuits, 
which defendants must either settle quickly or defend against at 
significant cost.  Such low-merit legal cases clog the American 
legal system and raise the cost of goods and services to 
consumers by forcing businesses that are sued to cover their 
legal expenses by raising prices. 
4  Our present system is as unfair to a 
deserving plaintiff as it is to a blameless defendant.  In theory, a 
negligent defendant must “make whole” an injured plaintiff by 
restoring him as nearly as possible to his position before the 
injury occurred.  In reality, American contingent fees are usually 
one-third of any recovery,5
                                                   
2 See generally W. Kent Davis, The International View of Attorney Fees in 
Civil Suits: Why is the United States the “Odd Man Out” in How It Pays Its 
Lawyers?, 16 ARIZ. J. INT’L & COMP. L. 361 (1999). 
 and litigation costs paid by the 
3 I intentionally avoid the term “frivolous” because it has a legal meaning; it 
refers to the standard under which a court may sanction litigants under Rule 11 
of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure and state law counterparts to Rule 11. See 
FED. R. CIV. P. 11. Not all abusive lawsuits are frivolous in this sense. To avoid 
confusion, this paper will not refer to suits as “frivolous” outside of the context 
of Rule 11. 
4 ABC News Special: The Trouble with Lawyers (ABC television broadcast 
Jan. 2, 1996). 
5 HERBERT M. KRITZER, RISKS, REPUTATIONS, AND REWARDS: CONTINGENCY 
FEE LEGAL PRACTICE IN THE UNITED STATES 39 tbl.2.4 (2004). 
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plaintiff may soak up a substantial additional percentage of any 
judgment or settlement.6
Despite these defects, the American rule has many 
defenders, who argue that the costs of the current system are 
exaggerated and that adopting a loser pays rule would replace 
current injustices and inefficiencies with graver ones.  Primary 
among the concerns of these scholars and commentators is the 
worry that injured parties might be unwilling to run even a small 
risk of incurring liability for ruinous attorneys’ fees.
  Also, potential plaintiffs with injuries 
that are significant but worth less than their lawyers’ fees can be 
denied access to justice entirely. 
7  Even those 
not so deterred, this argument goes, could still be induced by 
veteran defendants to settle for far less than their claim is 
worth.8
 
  Such objections are serious and deserve careful 
attention from reformers who wish to promote a more just and 
efficient legal order.  Loser pays would not be an improvement 
over the current system if middle-class plaintiffs with strong 
legal claims became fearful of seeking justice.  The case for a 
loser pays depends on its advocates honestly and convincingly 
addressing this concern, as this article does extensively in Part 
IV. 
Any analysis of a legal reform proposal should begin with a 
clear statement of the features we want our justice system to 
have, and it should then evaluate the proposal in light of those 
features.  A viable reform should advance broadly attractive 
goals, not merely contentious ideological commitments or 
narrow partisan interests.  While the substantive law allocates 
benefits and burdens that are exogenous to the litigation 
process, some procedural rules, like those concerning attorneys’ 
fees, allocate the transaction costs of seeking justice, including 
exposure to risk.  What can we all agree that we want from these 
                                                   
6 WALTER K. OLSON, THE LITIGATION EXPLOSION 44 (1991). 
7 See generally Deborah L. Rhode, Too Much Law, Too Little Justice: Too 
Much Rhetoric, Too Little Reform, 11 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 989, 1005 (1998). 
8 John F. Vargo, The American Rule on Attorney Fee Allocation: The 
Injured Person’s Access to Justice, 42 AM. U. L. REV. 1567, 1609-10 (1993).  See 
generally Rhode, supra note 7. 
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rules?  This author believes that the following five goals reflect 
widely shared values about how these rules ought to function. 
First, procedural reforms should have the effect of promoting 
compliance with the law, or at least should not discourage 
compliance. Although the justice of specific substantive laws 
might be debatable, if a body of law is generally just, the premise 
that procedural rules should promote legal compliance should 
be uncontroversial. 
Second, victims should be fully compensated.  All else being 
equal, a legal procedure is preferable to the extent that 
wrongfully injured victims are returned as nearly as possible to 
their uninjured states.  We may disagree about how costly such 
reparation must become before it becomes unduly punitive, but 
this paper will assume that full compensation for wrongful 
injuries is generally a desirable goal of procedural reform. 
Third, all else being equal, transaction costs should be as low 
as possible.  If a given procedure can enforce the law and 
compensate victims as well as or better than a different 
procedure, and do so at less cost, then it should be adopted and 
the alternative rejected. 
Fourth, the transaction costs associated with litigation 
should not be allocated to a legally innocent party if otherwise 
reasonable alternatives are available.  In general, a system that 
imposes heavy costs on a defendant who is not liable is inferior 
to one that does not do so.  By the same token, a system that 
imposes heavy costs on a deserving plaintiff is inferior to a 
system that does not.  There may be good public policy reasons 
to subsidize plaintiffs who bring some kinds of losing cases.  In 
such instances, the cost of those subsidies is better shared by the 
society that benefits from the existence of a system of civil 
justice rather than concentrated on an individual innocent 
party. 
Fifth, procedural rules should not discourage parties with 
strong legal claims from pursuing justice.  In particular, 
different parties have different levels of risk aversion, and 
procedural rules should not have the effect of barring the 
courthouse door to risk-averse parties with good cases. 
This paper will evaluate the American rule and a loser pays 
reform proposal on the basis of how well they serve these five 
broadly attractive criteria.  If the loser pays reform proposal is 
superior to the American rule on these grounds, it ought to 
command broad support.  Part I of this paper describes the 
Spring 2011 Rutgers Journal of Law & Public Policy Vol 8:3 
 
571 
current state of the legal marketplace and how some of its 
participants profit from abusing it.  Part II summarizes the best 
theoretical research into what kinds of effects we could expect 
loser pays to have on litigation.  Part III builds on the 
hypotheses developed in Part II by examining evidence from two 
important loser pays experiments here in America.  Part IV 
explores the possibility of preserving access to justice for 
plaintiffs with reasonably strong lawsuits through a system of 
litigation insurance.  Part V offers a specific loser pays reform 
proposal and guidelines for its implementation. 
PART I: THE STATUS QUO 
Reporting on abusive litigation tends to focus on the most 
outrageous claims, often involving enormous claims for 
damages, such as a recent $54 million lawsuit that Washington, 
D.C. Administrative Judge Roy Pearson filed against his local 
dry cleaner for allegedly losing a pair of slacks.9  The media also 
report on cases in which plaintiffs are awarded large sums for 
injuries they suffered after assuming commonly understood 
risks, as was situation with the plaintiff who was scalded when 
she spilled a hot cup of McDonald’s coffee.10
Such cases get media attention because they involve 
particularly bizarre facts, colorful characters, or millions of 
dollars, or because they potentially affect our lives.  But abusive 
lawsuits that are not so lurid or absurd are not unusual.  Most of 
them cost the individual defendants little; but collectively, they 
drive up the prices that we pay for groceries, automobiles, health 
  Other kinds of 
suits that get major press attention are typically class actions or 
government-led claims that target companies for selling popular 
but arguably unhealthy products, such as high-calorie foods or 
violent video games. 
                                                   
9 Marc Fisher, Judge Who Seeks Millions for Lost Pants Has His 
(Emotional) Day in Court, WASH. POST, June 13, 2007, at B1.  Studies have 
indicated that 65-85% of jury-eligible people in the United States believe that 
there are too many frivolous lawsuits filed.  Richard Waites & Jim Lawrence, 
Juror Perceptions About Lawsuits and Tort Reform, THE ADVOCATES, 2, 
http://www.theadvocates.com/Juror%20Perceptions%20About%20Lawsuits%
20and%20Tort%20Reform.pdf (last visited Apr. 5, 2011). 
10 KRITZER, supra note 5, at 2. 
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care, and other goods and services.  This section will describe 
how the legal marketplace currently works, why abusive lawsuits 
are filed, and how the lawyers who file them make a living. 
Lawsuits vary in the amount of money they seek, the 
complexity of the underlying facts (which often determines how 
many hours a lawyer must spend on a case), and the merits of 
the case (defined here as the likelihood that the plaintiff will win 
at trial). 
Figure 1 
 
 
Figure 1 depicts the litigation universe in two dimensions by 
holding the number of hours worked constant.  The curved line 
represents a contingent-fee lawyer’s financial break-even point 
(or “opportunity cost”) for a given case, assuming that it goes to 
trial.  The higher the financial stakes of a particular case are, the 
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lower the legal merit of the case needs to be in order to give a 
lawyer an economic incentive to file it.  A case brought by a 
severely injured plaintiff against a defendant who is very 
unlikely to be responsible for her injuries, for example, would be 
located in the upper left corner of the figure.  The most 
profitable cases, featuring both high financial stakes and high 
legal merit, are located at the top right corner of the figure. 
“Abusive lawsuits”—represented by the shaded area in 
Figure 1—have little legal merit, regardless of the magnitude of 
the recovery sought.  “Lottery suits,” as the term will be used 
herein, are defined by a combination of low legal merit and very 
high stakes.  Many of these cases meet or exceed a lawyer’s 
break-even threshold for trials not because they have merit but 
because there is so much money at stake that a contingent-fee 
lawyer can make a living by “hitting the jackpot” in only a small 
minority of these cases. 
Professor Herbert Kritzer of the University of Wisconsin Law 
School describes the practices of three lawyers whose behavior 
can be plotted on Figure 1: “Brown handles mostly larger cases 
involving significant damages; he prides himself on taking and 
winning large recoveries in cases that other firms decline as too 
risky.  Adams and Clarke handle a lot of very routine cases, most 
of which would not be economical to take to trial . . . .”11  We can 
infer from Kritzer’s description that Brown at least sometimes 
takes lottery suits.  Adams and Clarke, on the other hand, 
handle primarily cases below the “break-even” line on Figure 1 
for trials—that is, Adams and Clarke would lose money on these 
cases if forced to litigate them.  Some of these cases will be the 
kinds of small, meritorious claims found in the bottom right-
hand corner of Figure 1.  Others are likely to be “nuisance suits,” 
a term which will be used herein to refer to lawsuits 
characterized by modest stakes and little legal merit.12
                                                   
11 Id. at 98. 
  Such 
12 Professor Kritzer argued recently in an online forum that most nuisance 
suits in his data set featured weak evidence of causation rather than weak 
evidence of a breach of a duty of care.  See Rebecca Love Kourlis, Would “Loser 
Pays” Eliminate Frivolous Lawsuits and Defenses?, NEW TALK (Aug. 19-20, 
2008), http://newtalk.org/2008/08/would-loser-pays-eliminate-fri.php 
(online discussion).  For the purpose of this analysis, these weaknesses are 
interchangeable: both are features of a suit with little legal merit, filed solely for 
settlement value. 
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suits, located in the bottom left-hand corner of Figure 1, are filed 
for the sole purpose of inducing a defendant to settle them in 
order to avoid the expense of going to trial.  Nuisance suits, by 
this definition, fall below any contingent-fee lawyer’s break-even 
threshold for taking a case to trial.  Therefore, such cases must 
be settled early in order to be lucrative enough for the lawyers 
who file them.  This paper will explore the possibility that loser 
pays reforms can reduce or eliminate abusive lawsuits, 
especially nuisance suits. 
PART II: WHO FILES NUISANCE SUITS? 
We usually imagine that nuisance suits are filed by struggling 
lawyers operating alone or in a small firm, “chasing 
ambulances,” or otherwise aggressively marketing their services 
to disoriented or hesitant clients.  We don’t think of them as 
being filed by the kinds of lawyers who labor at complex, 
multiyear disputes in elite downtown offices.  Economists Eyal 
Zamir and Ilana Ritov offer a model of the legal marketplace 
that suggests that these stereotypes are largely correct: there is a 
clear pecking order among plaintiffs’ lawyers.13
Contingent fees are fairly uniform within a given geographic 
area: most plaintiffs’ lawyers charge a percentage of a recovery 
in any case they take—usually about 33 percent, though in some 
jurisdictions the going rate is higher.
 
14  Zamir and Ritov show 
that standard pricing of contingent-fee legal services is possible 
in part because simple, strong cases afford lawyers higher 
effective hourly rates than do complex, weak cases even if the 
nominal contingent fee is identical.15
                                                   
13 See generally Eyal Zamir & Ilana Ritov, Neither Saints Nor Devils: A 
Behavioral Analysis of Attorneys’ Contingent Fees, SOCIAL SCIENCE RESEARCH 
NETWORK (Jan. 22, 2008), 
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1085985.  
  As a result, successful 
14 Lester Brickman, The Market for Contingent Fee-Financed Tort 
Litigation: Is It Price Competitive?, 25 CARDOZO L. REV. 65, 78 (2003).  See also 
KRITZER, supra note 5, at 38-40 (reporting that a majority of plaintiffs’ lawyers 
surveyed charged a one-third contingent fee).  Kritzer disagrees that his finding 
suggests that fees are fairly uniform.  See id. 
15 Zamir & Ritov, supra note 13, at 6-7. 
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lawyers (who can be extremely selective about the cases they 
take) accept only those cases that can produce very high 
effective hourly compensation: “[T]he standard rate endures in 
the market thanks to a process of assortative matching, that is, 
the process through which plaintiffs with very strong cases 
contract with the very best lawyers, second-best cases are 
handled by second-best attorneys, and so forth.”16
Indeed, most plaintiffs’ lawyers decline most of the cases 
offered them, and the rate at which the most successful of them 
turn down cases is far above the average.
 
17  There is also 
evidence that an elite subset of lawyers is able to attain 
exceptionally high effective hourly rates through careful 
selection of cases.18
                                                   
16 Id. 
  Figure 2 illustrates how, according to Zamir 
and Ritov, cases and lawyers are matched. 
17 KRITZER, supra note 5, at 76. 
18 Id. at 75-76. 
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Figure 2 
 
 
The dotted line in the top right corner of Figure 2 delineates 
a portfolio of highly lucrative cases that would be representative 
of a top plaintiffs’ lawyer.  The Zamir-Ritov model implies that, 
just as there is an upper echelon within the ranks of plaintiffs’ 
lawyers, there is also a lower echelon, whose portfolio is defined 
by the curved series of dashes in the bottom left section of 
Figure 2.  Such “nuisance lawyers” can attract only the weakest 
cases. Kritzer describes the investment strategy that such a 
lawyer can be expected to adopt: “[T]he lawyer can be relatively 
nonselective.  Under this approach, the lawyer may want to 
minimize the investment in most cases.  The goal is to achieve 
lots of small recoveries, with relatively little investment.”19
                                                   
19 Id. at 15. 
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The most notable exceptions to the rule that only struggling 
lawyers file dubious suits are low-merit mass torts and class 
action suits, which attract elite lawyers because they offer 
enormous efficiencies of scale. 20  These kinds of cases concern 
hundreds or thousands of similarly injured plaintiffs and are 
usually settled en masse.21  Because they require lawyers to 
spend little or no time on any individual claimant, they can be 
very profitable for lawyers even if each individual case would 
have little value on its own.22
HOW DO NUISANCE LAWYERS REMAIN IN BUSINESS? 
 
Experts have struggled to explain how a lawyer can make 
money by filing lawsuits that cost more money to try than the 
lawyer can hope to recover in fees.  If the defendant knows that 
the cost to the plaintiff of taking the case to trial is sure to 
exceed the amount he can recover, it seems to follow that the 
defendant will refuse to settle, knowing that the plaintiff is likely 
to drop the case.  
Nonetheless, nuisance suits often culminate in a settlement 
offer from a defendant. Economists David Rosenberg and 
Steven Shavell have shown that a defendant will settle a 
nuisance suit if the cost of filing an initial response to a 
complaint is significant, since the cost of replying itself makes 
settlement attractive.23
                                                   
20 See RICHARD A. NAGAREDA, MASS TORTS IN A WORLD OF SETTLEMENT ix 
(2007) (“One significant facet of the mass tort phenomenon consists of the 
emergence and operation of an elite segment of the personal injury plaintiffs’ 
bar.”). 
  Even for cases in which the initial 
response is not prohibitively expensive, a defendant may not be 
able to tell whether a particular suit is a nuisance suit, according 
21 See id. at 9.  
22 See R.A. Nagareda, Embedded Aggregation in Civil Litigation, 95 
CORNELL L. REV. 1105, 1154-55 (2010). 
23 D. Rosenberg & S. Shavell, A Model in Which Suits are Brought for Their 
Nuisance Value, 5 INT’L REV. L. & ECON. 3 (1985). 
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to lawyer and economist Lucian Bebchuk.24
Paradoxically, plaintiffs’ lawyers who file nuisance suits are 
also helped by ethics rules that prohibit them from withdrawing 
from cases if doing so would impose a substantial hardship on a 
client.
 For certain types of 
claims, like mass torts, this explanation seems particularly 
compelling: the transaction costs of sifting through thousands of 
claims to separate the good cases from the bad can exceed the 
cost to settle each claim. 
25  While the Model Rules of Professional Conduct 
nominally permit lawyers to withdraw from representing a 
client if continued representation creates an “unreasonable 
financial burden” on the lawyer,26 case law overwhelmingly 
holds that a client’s refusal of an offer of settlement does not 
justify withdrawal under this provision.27
Bebchuk and Andrew Guzman have shown that contingent-
fee arrangements enhance the pretrial bargaining power of 
plaintiffs themselves by insulating them from almost all the 
considerable marginal costs of going to trial, which are borne by 
the contingent-fee attorney and, of course, the defendant.
  These ethical 
constraints enable a plaintiff’s lawyer to credibly commit in 
advance to trying any case that he files on behalf of a client if it 
is not first settled. 
28
                                                   
24 See generally Lucian Arye Bebchuk, Litigation and Settlement Under 
Imperfect Information, 15 RAND J. ECON. 404 (1984). 
  
Plaintiffs’ bargaining power would not be enhanced in this way 
if plaintiffs’ lawyers were free to drop cases that do not settle. 
25 See MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 1.16(b)(1) (2009). 
26 See MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 1.16(b)(6) (2009). 
27 See H.M. Erichson & B.C. Zipursky, Consent Versus Closure, 96 CORNELL 
L. REV. 265, 287-89 (2011).   
28 Lucian Arye Bebchuk & Andrew T. Guzman, How Would You Like to 
Pay for That? The Strategic Effects of Fee Arrangements on Settlement Terms, 
1 HARV. NEGOTIATION L. REV. 53, 54 (1996).  Kritzer’s survey of contingent-fee 
lawyers practicing in Wisconsin indicates that lawyers make far less money per 
hour on cases that are tried than they do on cases that are settled. See KRITZER, 
supra note 5 tbl.6.2a, 6.2b. 
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Still, if a distinct class of lawyers is responsible for most 
nuisance litigation, as Zamir and Ritov’s research implies, it 
might seem as though defendants could just identify those 
lawyers and systematically refuse to settle the cases that they 
file, at least in cases that do not demand an unusually costly 
initial response or whose outcome is not highly uncertain. 
Presumably, the lawyers so targeted would stop filing nuisance 
cases, since they would not be lucrative enough to justify the 
cost of going to trial. 
That defendants have not adopted this strategy on any large 
scale is explained by a collective-action problem: it is impossible 
for all frequently-sued individuals and businesses to commit to 
each other that they will litigate every suit filed by a designated 
nuisance lawyer.  In any individual case, a defendant is 
motivated to settle early because she knows that, if she holds 
out, the platintiff’s lawyers will be financially sustained by 
settlement proceeds from other defendants who have settled, 
and will settle, other cases, and will therefore be able to continue 
to press their claim against her. 
Defendants’ incentive to settle nuisance cases—even those 
from lawyers who habitually file them—is a version of a classic 
decision problem that game theorists call the “Stag/Hare 
game.”29
                                                   
29 In the original Stag/Hare game, two hunters must decide whether to 
pursue a stag or a hare.  Killing a stag requires the commitment of both hunters 
and produces the most meat for each participant.  However, because each 
hunter can’t count on the other to pursue a stag also, the hunters usually decide 
to pursue hares, which can be killed independently, even though they are less 
filling.  See DOUGLAS G. BAIRD, ROBERT H. GERTNER & RANDAL C. PICKER, GAME 
THEORY AND THE LAW 35-36 (1994). 
  Figure 3 illustrates the Stag/Hare game in the context 
of two defendants who must decide whether to settle or litigate 
nuisance suits.  Each of the four boxes represents a possible 
outcome for the defendants depending on the decisions they 
both make.  Defendant 1’s outcomes (“best,” “middle,” or 
“worst”) appear first in each box, while Defendant 2’s outcomes 
appear second. 
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Figure 3 
 
 
 
If all defendants take nuisance suits from a particular 
nuisance lawyer to trial, they will drive that lawyer out of 
business.  This is the best outcome for the defendants, 
represented by the upper left-hand box in Figure 3.  But if some 
defendants settle, those who do not settle will incur trial 
expenses unnecessarily.  This is the worst outcome, represented 
by the upper right-hand box for Defendant 1 and by the lower 
left-hand box for Defendant 2.  If either defendant fears that the 
other will sometimes settle, either due to risk aversion or by 
strategic mistake, then she will also adopt a strategy of 
settlement.  As a result, defendants generally find themselves 
participating in a pervasive culture of settlement, even when the 
suits settled are extremely weak.  This outcome, represented by 
the lower, right-hand box in Figure 3, is the only stable 
equilibrium in the game.30
Indeed, the empirical literature shows that the United States 
has developed a culture of nearly universal settlement.
 
31
                                                   
30 See id. at 36.  In economists’ parlance, there are two Nash equilibriums 
in this game: [litigate, litigate] and [settle, settle].  See id.  However, [litigate, 
litigate] is not “trembling hand perfect.” SHAUN H. HEAP, YANIS VAROUFAKIS, 
GAME THEORY: A CRITICAL INTRODUCTION 68-70 (1995).  Therefore, universal 
litigation is not a stable equilibrium in this game if the players occasionally 
make errors.  Only [settle, settle] survives dominance refinement analysis and is 
the expected equilibrium in this game. 
  Only 
31 See KRITZER, supra note 5, at 177. 
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about 7 to 9 percent of lawsuits filed actually proceed to trial.32
PART III: WHAT TO EXPECT FROM LOSER PAYS 
  
Lawyers and policymakers praise high settlement rates because 
settlement avoids the public and private expenses of a trial.  It is 
nonetheless worth noting that many low-merit lawsuits could be 
deterred if it were possible for defendants to commit in advance 
to taking them to trial. 
While researchers differ on what some of the effects of a 
loser pays rule might be—and certainly differ on the overall 
advisability of adopting one—there is broad consensus that a 
loser pays rule would reduce the number of nuisance suits.33
A simple example will illustrate why a defendant would insist 
on paying less to settle a nuisance suit under loser pays.  
Suppose a plaintiff has suffered a loss of $10,000 (an amount 
that is not in controversy in this example), but his suit has little 
legal merit because the defendant probably did not cause his 
injury, giving the plaintiff only a 20 percent chance of winning 
at trial.  Suppose that the plaintiff’s lawyer (who is working 
under a contingent-fee agreement for 33 percent of any 
recovery) and the defendant would each have to invest $5,000 
worth of legal services in order to try the case.  The plaintiff’s 
 
This reduction would occur because defendants would be willing 
to pay much less to settle low-merit suits under loser pays than 
they currently do. 
                                                   
32 See David M. Trubek et al., The Costs of Ordinary Litigation, 31 UCLA L. 
REV. 72, 89 (1983); Kevin McCabe & Laura Inglis, Using Neuroeconomics 
Experiments to Study Tort Reform, MERCATUS POL’Y SERIES, Nov. 2007, at 12, 
available at 
http://mercatus.org/sites/default/files/publication/20080104_Tort_Final.pdf. 
33 For the seminal early work suggesting that a loser pays rule reduces the 
number of frivolous suits filed, see Steven Shavell, Suit, Settlement, and Trial: A 
Theoretical Analysis Under Alternative Methods for the Allocation of Legal 
Costs, 11 J. LEGAL STUD. 55, 59-60 (1982).  See also GORDON TULLOCK, TRIALS ON 
TRIAL: THE PURE THEORY OF LEGAL PROCEDURE 17, 65-67 (1980); Lucian Arye 
Bebchuk, A New Theory Concerning the Credibility and Success of Threats to 
Sue, 25 J. LEGAL STUD. 1, 19-20 (1996); McCabe & Inglis, supra note 32, at 17-18.  
But cf. Ronald Braeutigam, Bruce Owen & John Panzar, An Economic Analysis 
of Alternative Fee Shifting Systems, 47 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 173, 181-82 
(1984) (results ambiguous). 
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lawyer could expect a fee of only $667, since 20 percent of 
$10,000 is $2,000, and 33 percent of $2,000 is $667, for 
$5,000 worth of work if the case goes to trial. 
The plaintiff’s lawyer, therefore, plans to settle the case.  
Under the American rule, he may extract between $2,000 and 
$7,000 from the defendant in settlement, because the defendant 
knows that it will have to spend $5,000 on unrecoverable legal 
costs if it fails to settle and because the case has an additional 
expected value of $2,000 for the plaintiff. 
Under loser pays, however, defendants would either refuse to 
settle or would offer far less in settlement.  In our example, the 
defendant has an expected cost of going to trial of only $3,667 
under a loser pays rule, reflecting its 20 percent chance of losing 
the case and paying damages and both parties’ legal fees.34
Loser pays would also have some impact on the settlement 
prospects of mass-tort claims by deterring some of the 
thousands of low-merit individual claims that are based on more 
or less the same facts.  Under the American rule, mass-tort 
lawyers have an incentive to recruit thousands of plaintiffs with 
dubious claims, since they know that the cost to defendants of 
ferreting out the weak or even fraudulent cases and taking them 
to trial is prohibitively high.  Under loser pays, mass-tort 
lawyers would be less able to force settlements by pointing to 
the enormous transaction costs of conducting thousands of 
individual trials.  Without this leverage, mass-tort lawyers 
would have less incentive to include weak claims in their 
portfolios.  Loser pays would also reduce the number of low-
  
Therefore, the defendant would never pay more than $3,667 to 
settle this case—just over half of the maximum of $7,000 that a 
plaintiff could extract from the same suit under the current 
system. Because loser pays would make nuisance suits less 
valuable, the effective hourly rates of nuisance lawyers would 
decline.  In the face of reduced earnings, some nuisance lawyers 
would surely choose to file different kinds of cases (such as 
meritorious small claims), or they would migrate to other 
specialties or careers. 
                                                   
34 This example assumes that the plaintiff’s attorney would recover only his 
contracted-for fees. If instead the plaintiff’s attorney could recover his actual 
incurred cost of $5,000, the analysis would not change materially: the expected 
cost to the defendant would be $4,000, still $3,000 less than under the 
American rule. 
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merit class action lawsuits, but not to the extent that it would 
individual cases, in which legal fees and expenses are bound to 
be a higher proportion of a defendant’s total exposure. 
MORE MERITORIOUS SMALL CLAIMS 
In addition to reducing the number of nuisance suits, most 
researchers agree that a loser pays rule would make viable some 
small, highly meritorious lawsuits that cannot be profitably tried 
in the current system.35  Figure 4 shows how a loser pays rule 
would shift the break-even line for suits taken to trial and 
therefore, by inference, the viability of all meritorious suits, 
including those that settle.36
 
 
                                                   
35 See TULLOCK, supra note 33, at 65-67; Lucian Arye Bebchuk, A New 
Theory Concerning the Credibility and Success of Threats to Sue, 25 J. LEGAL 
STUD. 1, 19-20 (1996) (demonstrating mathematically that plaintiff negotiating 
power is enhanced for suits with a greater than 50% chance of prevailing at 
trial); Keith N. Hylton, Litigation Cost Allocation Rules and Compliance with 
the Negligence Standard, 22 J. LEGAL  STUD. 457, 464-66 (1993); Avery Katz, 
Measuring the Demand for Litigation: Is the English Rule Really Cheaper?, 3 
J.L. ECON. & ORG. 143, 156-57 (1987); Shavell, supra note 33, at 59-62; Edward 
A. Snyder & James W. Hughes, The English Rule for Allocating Legal Costs: 
Evidence Confronts Theory, 6 J.L. ECON. & ORG. 345, 349 (1990). 
36 The break-even line for all suits, including those that settle, would shift in 
tandem with the break-even line for suits reaching trial.  This means that what 
are now “nuisance lawyers” would have to seek higher-merit cases under loser 
pays in order to maintain their current levels of compensation even if their cases 
continue to settle at similar rates. 
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Figure 4 
 
 
The increased viability of small, meritorious claims would 
have both benefits and costs. On one hand, a person with a 
modest but meritorious claim deserves compensation, and more 
complete compensation for victims is one of the most important 
ways in which a loser pays rule could make the U.S. legal system 
more just.  Critics of loser pays who worry that the rule would 
limit access to the courts often fail to acknowledge that the 
American rule bars court access for small but strong claims of 
injury, unless the claims can be grouped into a class action.  On 
the other hand, a significant influx of small, meritorious claims 
under loser pays might keep the overall amount of litigation, 
and thus the overall cost of the civil justice system, from 
decreasing as a result of reform. 
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Fortunately, there are reasons to think that the reduction in 
nuisance suits following the adoption of loser pays would be 
greater than the increase in small, highly meritorious lawsuits.  
While it is true that many such claims are too small to be worth 
taking to trial under the current system, many nuisance claims 
are small as well.  Yet nuisance claims of this kind are filed, 
anyway, for their settlement value—just as are, undoubtedly, 
substantial numbers of meritorious claims that are not too 
insignificant to be worth pursuing to trial.  Also, many small 
claims are currently litigated as class actions. 
Responses from Kritzer’s survey of contingent-fee lawyers in 
Wisconsin also suggest that more nuisance suits would be 
deterred under a loser pays rule than the number of new, highly 
meritorious claims filed as a result of the adoption of loser 
pays.37  Figure 5 shows the relative frequency of various reasons 
that contingent fee lawyers give when they decide to decline a 
case.38  Surveyed plaintiff’s lawyers named only a lack of legal 
liability as their reason for declining 47 percent of the cases they 
turned down, and they named both a lack of legal liability and a 
lack of adequate damages as a reason for declining another 13 
percent of rejected cases.39  Only 19 percent of rejected cases 
were declined for the sole reason that the expected size of the 
recovery was too low.40
 
 
                                                   
37 See Kritzer, supra note 5, at tbl.3.9. 
38 Id. 
39 Id. 
40 Id. 
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Figure 5 
 
 
 
These responses (combined with statistical principles) imply 
that of all the cases that lawyers are asked to pursue—on either 
side of their accept/reject threshold—a greater number have 
marginal legal merit than have merit but promise only 
marginally-sized recoveries.41
High-merit, low-damages injuries are also unlikely to be 
litigated to trial under loser pays because defendants would have 
no financial incentive to resist compensating those they have 
genuinely harmed.  Loser pays should therefore promote 
immediate, appropriate, handling of small injuries in order to 
avoid litigation.  Under the American rule, defendants are likely 
to treat small, high-merit claims just like nuisance claims and 
under-compensate genuinely injured victims.
  If that is so, the number of low-
merit cases that loser pays would discourage should be larger 
than the number of small, high-merit cases that loser pays 
encourages. 
42
                                                   
41 Perhaps this is the case because plaintiffs know whether they are injured 
but lack the specialized knowledge to know whether they are legally in the right. 
  Plaintiffs with 
small, good claims deserve more prompt and generous 
42 Potential class actions are, of course, an exception to this rule. 
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compensation than they currently get, and loser pays would 
incentivize defendants to provide this immediately. 
SETTLEMENT RATES 
Research is deeply split on the issue of whether a loser pays 
rule would increase or decrease the rate at which lawsuits are 
settled rather than tried.43  Loser pays, by increasing the amount 
of money in dispute in any given case (that is, by “raising the 
stakes” of litigation), may reduce settlement rates by magnifying 
differences of opinion between the parties about what each is 
likely to gain by going to trial.44  On the other hand, higher 
stakes could induce risk-averse parties to settle.45  Experiments 
designed to predict the effect that a loser pays rule would have 
on settlement rates have yielded mixed results.  Economists 
Kevin McCabe and Laura Inglis found that loser pays would 
lower rates of settlement,46 while two older experiments suggest 
that settlement rates would increase.47
                                                   
43 Some studies suggest that a loser pays rule will raise settlement rates.  
See, e.g., Michael R. Baye, Dan Kovenock & Casper D. de Vries, Comparative 
Analysis of Litigation Systems: An Auction-Theoretic Approach, 115 ECON. J. 
583, 599 (2005) (“To the extent that America’s reputation for being a litigious 
society is based on the sheer number of suits brought to trial, a movement 
toward the Continental or British system might reduce the number of suits and 
the strain on the court system.”) (footnote omitted); Snyder & Hughes, supra 
note 35, at 369.  Other studies suggest that a loser pays rule would lower 
settlement rates.  See, e.g., Keith N. Hylton, An Asymmetric-Information Model 
of Litigation, 22 INT’L REV. L. & ECON. 153, 162 (2002) (“[T]he British rule, 
consistent with earlier analyses, generat[es] the most litigation.”); McCabe & 
Inglis, supra note 32, at 18; Shavell, supra note 33, at 65-66. 
 
44 See Hylton, supra note 35, at 459.  
45 See Shavell, supra note 33, at 68. 
46 McCabe & Inglis, supra note 32, at 18. 
47 Don L. Coursey & Linda R. Stanley, Pretrial Bargaining Behavior within 
the Shadow of the Law: Theory and Experimental Evidence, 8 INT’L REV. L. & 
ECON., 161, 175-76 (1988); Peter J. Coughlan & Charles R. Plott, An 
Experimental Analysis of the Structure of Legal Fees: American Rule vs. 
English Rule 36 (Cal. Inst. of Tech. Div. of the Humanities & Soc. Scis., Working 
Paper No. 1025, 1997).  
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The question of the effect of loser pays on settlement rates, 
however, may not be as consequential as the extent of academic 
interest in the subject implies.  Only about 8% of lawsuits filed 
go to trial now.48  The rest are resolved by settlement, by 
dismissal or summary judgment, or by the plaintiff’s decision to 
drop the suit.49
In part because so few cases proceed to trial, most resources 
devoted to litigation are spent at its earlier stages, including 
settlement negotiations.  Figure 6 is a breakdown of the time 
that litigation attorneys report spending on various activities 
related to the resolution of lawsuits.  Because attorneys’ fees are 
by far the largest cost of litigation, these figures are a reasonable 
proxy for overall legal costs.  Importantly, litigation attorneys 
report that they spend only 8.6% of their time on hearings and 
trials.   Most of their time is devoted to activities that may 
precede serious settlement discussions: client interviews, case 
investigation, pretrial motions, and settlement negotiations.  
While an early settlement would avoid many of these expenses, 
a settlement on the eve of trial would avoid very few of them. 
 
 
                                                   
48 Trubek et al., supra note 32, at 89. 
49See id. 
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Figure 650
 
 
 
All else being equal, therefore, legal reforms that reduce 
filings are likely to reduce costs more than legal reforms that 
increase settlement rates, which are already very high.  Still, a 
loser pays rule can and should be carefully designed not only to 
discourage low-merit filings but also to promote settlement. 
LITIGATION COSTS PER CASE 
Critics of loser pays warn that even if the rule should reduce 
the number of lawsuits filed, the cost of litigation per case may 
increase because each party no longer necessarily and 
exclusively bears its own costs.51
                                                   
50Id. at 91, tbl.3. 
  Under a loser pays rule, each 
dollar of additional spending by either party is discounted by the 
probability that the other side would assume those costs upon 
51 See Baye, Kovenock & de Vries, supra note 43, at 599; Braeutigam, Owen 
& Panzar, supra note 33, at 180; Katz, supra note 35, at 144.  
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losing the case.52  Whereas $1,000 in additional spending under 
an American rule would be borne wholly by the party making 
the decision to spend, a party under a loser pays regime that 
estimated its chance of winning at 50 percent would only bear 
$500 of the additional $1,000 spent.53
This “cost-internalization” critique of loser pays is correct as 
applied to certain kinds of costs, but the charge that loser pays 
would increase overall costs per case is probably wrong in light 
of what we know about the kinds of costs that parties to 
litigation actually incur.  The theoretical studies that predict 
increased per-case expenditures under loser pays assume that a 
litigant’s choice to spend more on legal fees does not effectively 
require the opposing party to match those expenditures in 
response.  If litigation spending induces responsive spending in 
equal or greater amounts by the opposing party, what economist 
Avery Katz calls a “provocative expenditure,” then loser pays 
provides no incentive for the parties to run up these kinds of 
costs.
  Assuming that increased 
spending on legal services enhances a party’s chances of 
prevailing, parties will spend more on legal services under loser 
pays, loser pays critics argue, than they would under a system 
employing the American rule. 
54  Katz argues that loser pays would increase trial 
expenditures, but his argument assumes that legal spending is 
not provocative.55  He concedes that if it were, his concerns 
about loser pays would be misguided.56
Fortunately, empirical studies suggest that Katz’s 
assumption about the character of most litigation spending is 
 
                                                   
52 Katz, supra note 35, at 160 
53 Id. 
54 Id. at 161 n.28. 
55 See id. at 160-61. 
56 Id. at 161 n.28 (“[I]f the opponent is somehow bound to respond in kind 
to marginal expenditure, and if the parties act strategically, so as to take 
advantage of this, as perhaps may be the case in civil discovery, the English rule 
may reduce incentives to engage in provocative expenditure.”).  Katz explains 
elsewhere: “For example, if the case were even, and the opponent were expected 
to react in kind to marginal expenditure on a dollar–for-dollar basis, the English 
rule might not reduce the marginal cost of expenditure.” Id. at 172. 
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wrong.  Most decisions to spend money on litigation are 
provocative because they trigger a litigation event, such as a 
motion, discovery request, or pretrial conference, which 
requires the opposing party to undertake a costly activity in 
response.57  A leading empirical researcher who collects data on 
the legal system, Kritzer, seems to agree that litigation 
expenditures are mostly provocative in nature, though he 
opposes loser pays reforms.58  He reports that lawyers’ efforts in 
litigation are “largely determine[d]” by “the actions of the 
opposing party,” and that “[e]ach decision to invest additional 
effort will then influence the defense side, which in turn may 
make investments that require further investment by the 
plaintiff’s side.”59  Data from the Wisconsin Civil Litigation 
Research Project confirm that case complexity and associated 
litigation “events,” not the sums at stake, are the main drivers of 
litigation spending—a result that is at odds with the hypothesis 
embraced by critics of loser pays that parties under such a 
regime will be motivated to spend more overall.60
In fact, the American rule may cause per-case litigation 
spending to be higher than it would be under loser pays because 
America has very liberal discovery rules, and discovery requests 
are a very provocative expenditure.  Katz’s own model suggests 
that the American rule actively encourages any expenditure so 
provocative that it requires a much larger expenditure from the 
opposing party in response.
 
61
                                                   
57 See Trubek et al., supra note 32, at 102 tbl.8. 
  This is true of discovery requests: 
they are far faster and easier to draft than they are to respond to.  
Plaintiffs’ attorneys in the United States may currently choose to 
bury defendants in onerous discovery requests, knowing that 
their clients bear none of the costs of document production.  As 
58 KRITZER, supra note 5, at 17-18; Herbert M. Kritzer, “Loser Pays” 
Doesn’t, LEGAL AFF., Nov./Dec. 2005, at 24 (opposing loser pays on the grounds 
that it would result in increased litigation costs). 
59 KRITZER, supra note 5, at 17-18. 
60 See Trubek et al., supra note 32, at 102 tbl.8 (indicating that “events” 
such as motions and discovery requests are the primary driver of costs in the 
typical case). 
61 KRITZER, supra note 5, at 17-18. 
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Figure 6 shows, lawyers report that discovery is one of the most 
time-consuming litigation activities they undertake, so these 
costs are substantial, and are inflated by the American rule.  A 
loser pays rule would discourage excessive discovery in low-
merit suits.  It would also discourage defendants from the 
wasteful practice of filing standardized motions with little legal 
merit in order to require plaintiff’s counsel to spend greater time 
and effort researching and drafting a response. 
Thus, a close look at the prevalence of different kinds of 
spending done by parties to a lawsuit suggests that a loser pays 
rule probably would not increase overall per-case expenditures, 
and might even have the opposite effect.  Nevertheless, critics’ 
concern that loser pays rules would encourage higher spending 
remains well founded with respect to certain kinds of litigation 
costs and therefore should be addressed by reformers when they 
craft loser pays reform proposals. 
COMPLIANCE EFFECT 
The “compliance effect” is one of the most interesting and 
salutary results of a loser pays rule: potential defendants, facing 
the risk of having to pay a winning plaintiff’s legal fees, can be 
expected to try harder to meet legal standards of care when they 
engage in business activities.  In effect, loser pays makes legal 
compliance cheaper and legal culpability more expensive, 
motivating businesses and individuals to spend more money to 
ensure the blamelessness of their behavior.62
                                                   
62 See Hylton, supra note 43, at 154. 
  Figure 7 is a 
decision tree that compares the differing incentives that 
potential defendants have under the American rule and under a 
loser pays rule to invest in preventative safety measures. 
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Figure 7 
 
 
 
In this simple model, a potential defendant must decide 
whether to take a specific action at a fixed cost in order to 
comply with the law, for example, applying a non-skid surface to 
the front steps of a business.  This model assumes that courts 
sometimes make errors but that they are correct more often 
than they are wrong (that is, it assumes that: 1 > r > .5  > q > 0).  
A potential defendant can minimize its expected costs by 
spending up to the dollar amount represented by the variable m 
in order to comply with the legal standard of care.  For example, 
a business will choose to install that aforementioned non-skid 
surface only if doing so costs less than m. 
The mathematically inclined can solve for the optimal values 
of m under the American rule and under loser pays by setting 
the defendant’s expected costs for compliance and 
noncompliance at trial equal to each other: 
Finding optimal compliance expenditure under the 
American rule yields: 
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q(-J – C2 – m) + (1 – q) (-C2 – m) = r(-J – C2) + 
(1 – r) (-C2)  ==> m(American)* = J(r – q)] 
Finding optimal compliance expenditure under a loser pays 
rule yields: 
q(-J – C3 – m) + (1 – q) (– m) = r(-J – C3) + (1 – 
r) (0) ==>  m(loser pays)* = J(r - q) + C3(r – q) 
Because we know that r > q, we can now see that the optimal 
value of m under a loser pays rule is always higher than the 
optimal value of m under the American rule.  This means that a 
potential defendant will be motivated to spend more money on 
safety measures such as non-skid surfaces in a loser pays 
system.  An additional benefit not reflected in this simple model 
is that, if the prospective defendant complies with the law, a 
potential plaintiff’s injury is less likely to take place at all, a 
humanitarian as well as financial benefit.  
Economist Keith N. Hylton estimated the effect that a loser 
pays rule would have on legal compliance compared to the 
American rule.63  His model assumed that potential defendants 
would analyze compliance decisions on the basis of the 
probability of injury; parties’ likelihood of filing suit, settling, or 
litigating; and likely trial judgment.64  The results of Hylton’s 
simulation suggest that a loser pays rule would significantly 
increase the resources that defendants devote to complying with 
legal standards, and thus reduce the number of people injured.65
Hylton also attempted to determine which system 
maximized overall social welfare by adding up the costs of 
injury, compliance, and litigation under alternative regimes.  
Hylton’s model suggested that settlement rates would go down 
somewhat, but that the costs associated with lower settlement 
rates were dwarfed by the welfare-enhancing effect of greater 
 
                                                   
63 Hylton, supra note 43.  For his earlier version of the tort liability model, 
see Hylton, supra note 35.  This earlier version did not yield as strong a 
compliance effect because it failed to capture the effects of fee shifting on 
settlement offers.  Hylton, supra note 43, at 154 n.7. 
64 Hylton, supra note 43, at 155-58.  
65 Id. at 162. 
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legal compliance and increased public safety.66  Hylton 
concluded that loser pays was superior to the American rule at 
conserving resources and avoiding injuries.67
PART IV: LOSER PAYS IN ACTION 
 
Americans litigate far more often than do residents of other 
nations.  The share of our economy spent on litigation is at least 
twice that of Germany, France, England, and Northern Ireland, 
respectively.68  Our outsize litigation rates are driven in part by 
the fact that the American rule encourages nuisance suits, but 
myriad other differences between nations make it impossible to 
determine the size of that effect compared to the many other 
reasons why litigation rates differ between countries.69  For 
example, residents of nations with more comprehensive social 
insurance systems have fewer otherwise uncompensated costs 
associated with injuries and therefore may be less motivated to 
file lawsuits.70
 
  Therefore, arguments for loser pays in the U.S. 
should not rely too heavily on international differences in 
litigation rates uncontrolled by other relevant differences in the 
laws, politics, and populations of the countries compared. 
Since controlling for all such differences is impracticable, it 
is fortunate that there is some domestic evidence about the 
likely effects of a loser pays rule in the United States.  Alaska has 
always had a loser pays rule, and Florida briefly experimented 
with a loser pays rule applied only to medical-malpractice suits. 
                                                   
66 See id. 
67 Id. at 168. 
68 TOWERS PERRIN TILLINGHAST, supra note 1, at 4. 
69 See generally RICHARD A. POSNER, LAW AND LEGAL THEORY IN ENGLAND 
AND AMERICA 76-79 (1996). 
70 See Dana A. Kerr, et al., “A Cross-national Study of Government Social 
Insurance as an Alternative to Tort Liability,” 76 J. OF RISK & INS. 367, 368 
(2009). 
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THE ALASKAN EXPERIENCE 
Uniquely among the states, Alaska has had a nearly universal 
loser pays rule since it became a state in 1900.71  Rule 82 of the 
Alaska Rules of Civil Procedure provides: “Except as otherwise 
provided by law or agreed to by the parties, the prevailing party 
in a civil case shall be awarded attorney’s fees calculated under 
this rule.”72  The rule calculates fee awards for plaintiffs as a 
percentage of money damages recovered: 20% of the first 
$25,000 and 10% of any additional sums recovered at trial.73  
Prevailing defendants are awarded 30 percent of their actual 
attorneys’ fees for tried cases and 20 percent of actual fees for 
cases terminated by other means.74
Evidence of the effect of Alaska’s loser pays rule on its rate of 
civil filings is ambiguous.  Alaska recorded 5,793 civil filings per 
100,000 inhabitants in 1992.
  
75 This number was only slightly 
below the national median of 6,610 per 100,000 that year.76  
The composition of civil filings, though, differs somewhat from 
the national pattern.77
                                                   
71 Act of June 6, 1900, ch. 786, §§ 509-28, 31 Stat. 321, 415-18.  
  Domestic relations and probate matters, 
which are not governed by loser pays, form a much larger share 
of total civil litigation in Alaska (where they are 60% and 19% of 
the total Alaska caseload, respectively) than in the United States 
generally (where they comprise only 39% and 10% of the total 
 
72 ALASKA R. CIV. P. 82(a). 
73Id. at 82(b)(1).  Lesser percentages are recoverable in cases that are 
settled or are uncontested.  See id. 
74 Id. at 82(b)(2).  Plaintiffs who sue for nonmonetary damages may 
recover under this provision as well.  See id. 
75 SUSANNE DI PIETRO ET AL., ALASKA’S ENGLISH RULE: ATTORNEY’S FEE 
SHIFTING IN CIVIL CASES 79-80 (1995), available at 
http://www.ajc.state.ak.us/reports/atyfee.pdf. 
76 Id. 
77 See id. at 84. 
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caseload, respectively).78  By the same token, Alaska’s tort 
claims constitute a smaller share of Alaska’s litigation mix (5%) 
than they do in the country as a whole (10%).79
Most attorneys surveyed by the Alaska Judicial Council 
thought that Alaska’s loser pays rule did not significantly reduce 
the number of filings of “frivolous” suits because plaintiffs who 
file most such suits do so for “emotional,” rather than financial, 
reasons.
  These statistics 
suggest, but certainly do not prove, that loser pays may be 
responsible for more selective filing of tort claims in Alaska than 
in other jurisdictions. 
80 But the Council’s survey question, in asking about 
“frivolous” suits, was misleading, since “frivolous” is a legal term 
of art denoting only truly outlandish legal claims, as opposed to 
merely weak ones.  In fact, the Council concluded, on the basis 
of interviews with Alaska attorneys, Alaska’s loser pays rule 
reduced the number of low-merit cases filed by rational, middle-
income plaintiffs.81  The Council’s finding was merely 
qualitative, not quantitative, but nevertheless important, 
especially since defendants are able to recover only 20--30% of 
their actual fees under Alaska’s rule.  The Alaska Judicial 
Council also collected evidence indicating that small meritorious 
claims, particularly those seeking to collect on an unpaid debt, 
were filed more frequently in Alaska due to the likely availability 
of a fee award.82
It is difficult to generalize from Alaska’s experience with 
loser pays on account of Alaska’s unique geography.  The state 
has enormous natural resource reserves,
  This finding is consistent with the theoretical 
literature. 
83
                                                   
78 Id. at 83-84. 
 a large indigenous 
79 Id. 
80 DI PIETRO ET AL., supra note 73, at 132. 
81 Id. at 139. 
82 Id. at 104-05. 
83 See Alaska Dep’t of Labor & Workforce Dev., Alaska Gas Inducement Act 
Training Strategic Plan: A Call to Action 5 (2009) , available at  
http://labor.state.ak.us/AGIA_teams/docs-combined/agiaweb.pdf. 
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population,84 and substantially more men than women.85  Any 
one of these factors could affect the rate of tort litigation alone 
or in combination in ways that are not fully understood.  For 
example, there is some evidence that men are more likely than 
women to be involved in legal disputes.86
THE FLORIDA EXPERIMENT 
  Nonetheless, the 
available evidence suggests that Alaska has under-implemented 
a fundamentally sound policy, which better compensates 
deserving small claimants and discourages the kinds of filings 
that have a low probability of success.  While fee shifting is 
standard in Alaska, the state’s fee schedules fail to compensate 
prevailing parties fully for their litigation costs, reducing the 
rule’s salutary effects. 
In 1980, Florida embarked on an important experiment.  In 
response to escalating medical-malpractice insurance rates, the 
state legislature adopted a loser pays rule exclusively for 
medical-malpractice lawsuits.87  The Florida Medical 
Association and the insurance industry lobbied for the 
provision, which they hoped would reduce the rate of abusive 
litigation and thus the insurance premiums paid by doctors and 
hospitals.88
                                                   
84 See Alaska Quick Facts, U.S. CENSUS BUREAU (Nov. 4, 2010 12:46:17 
EDT), http://quickfacts.census.gov/qfd/states/02000.html (American Indian 
and Alaska Native persons make up 15.2% of the population of Alaska and only 
1% of the United States population as a whole.) 
  However, both groups quickly discovered a problem 
 
85 Id. (Women comprise 48.1% of the population of Alaska and 50.7% of the 
population of the United States as a whole.) 
 
86 See, e.g., Michael J. Goldberg, The Propensity to Sue and the Duty of 
Fair Representation: A Second Point of View, 41 INDUS. & LAB. REL. REV. 456, 
457 (1988). 
87 Ch. 80-67, 1980 Fla. Laws 225 (codified at FLA. STAT. § 768.56 (1980)), 
repealed by ch. 85-175, 1985 Fla. Laws 1225. 
88 See Avram Goldstein, Lawyer’s $4.4-Million Award Ignites Furor, 
MIAMI HERALD, Sept. 28, 1982, at A1. 
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with the new system—the frequent inability of victorious 
defendants actually to collect their attorneys’ fees from insolvent 
plaintiffs89—and they were taken aback by the multi-million 
dollar plaintiff’s attorneys’ fee that a Florida doctor who had lost 
the case against him was ordered to pay.90  With every interest 
group lobbying for its repeal, Florida’s loser pays law was wiped 
from the books in 1985.91
The first rigorous analysis of the Florida law’s effects was 
published five years later, and its findings suggest that the loser 
pays experiment was given short shrift by policymakers and its 
erstwhile advocates.
 
92  Economists Edward A. Snyder and 
James W. Hughes found that 54% of medical malpractice 
plaintiffs voluntarily dropped their lawsuits under Florida’s 
loser pays rule, while only 44% of plaintiffs dropped their suits 
when the American rule was in force both before and after the 
loser pays rule was in effect.93  Loser pays also almost halved the 
share of medical malpractice lawsuits that went to trial—from 
11% to 6% (see Figure 8).94
 
 
                                                   
89 COMM. ON HEALTH CARE & INS., FLA. H.R., STAFF ANALYSIS OF HB 1352, 
H.R. DOC. NO. PCB85-02/BS, at 8 (1985). 
90 B. Richard Young, Comment, Medical Malpractice in Florida: 
Prescription for Change, 10 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 593, 608 (1983). 
91 See ch. 85-175, 1985 Fla. Laws 1225. 
92 See Snyder & Hughes, supra note 35, at 377-78. 
93 See id. at 363-64. 
94 See id. at 364. 
Spring 2011 Rutgers Journal of Law & Public Policy Vol 8:3 
 
600 
Figure 895
 
 
 Note: Percentages may not add up to 100 due to rounding. 
 
Supporting the hypothesis that more plaintiffs with weak 
suits dropped them under Florida’s loser pays rule, cases 
governed by loser pays were settled for higher amounts 
($94,489), on average, than were cases governed by the 
American rule ($73,786).96  Most notably, settlements of less 
than $10,000 dropped from 49% of all settled cases under the 
American rule to less than 37% under loser pays,97
Similarly, while a smaller percentage of medical-malpractice 
suits went to trial in the years that the loser pays rule was in 
effect, the average trial award came close to tripling, from 
 suggesting 
that some low-value settlements under the American rule were 
paid to the sort of nuisance complainant who did not actually 
file suit or the sort of plaintiff who dropped his lawsuit during 
the period when loser pays was in force. 
                                                   
95 See id. at 363-64. 
96 James W. Hughes & Edward A. Snyder, Litigation and Settlement Under 
the English and American Rules: Theory and Evidence, 38 J.L. & ECON. 225, 
243 tbl.7 (1995). 
97 Id. 
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$25,190 to $69,390 in constant dollars, and plaintiffs more 
often prevailed at trial.98  Hughes and Snyder concluded that the 
higher average was the direct result of the loser pays rule’s 
elimination of many weak cases: “Having found that plaintiff 
prospects improve under the English rule, we are able to 
establish that these effects necessarily reflect an improved 
selection of claims reaching the settle-versus-litigate stage.”99
Florida did experience an increase in per-case litigation 
expenses, both for those that settled and those that proceeded to 
trial during the loser pays experiment.
 
100  However, because the 
average trial award almost tripled during this period as well,101
While the evidence from Florida’s ambitious experiment is 
ambiguous and complex, it confirms to a striking degree 
predictions made in the theoretical literature: litigants with 
weak cases were more likely to abandon their claims under loser 
pays, which allowed lawyers and courts to focus on more 
meritorious suits.  The increased size of the average settlement 
and judgment under Florida’s temporary loser pays regime also 
tends to support this view.  Litigation expenses per case, 
including attorneys’ fees, did rise during this period,
 it 
is possible that defendants were simply spending more on each 
individual case because the pool of cases was smaller but 
stronger (i.e., the stakes were higher, and therefore the extra 
effort put into defending them was well worth making). 
102
Did Florida’s version of loser pays work better or worse there 
than the American rule?  The large increase in dropped claims 
and the lower rate of trials suggest that Florida’s loser pays law 
was a promising experiment that lawmakers abandoned too 
quickly.  Doctors referred to anecdotal evidence that the rule 
 although 
it remains possible that expenditures for cases of similar size 
and merit were unchanged. 
                                                   
98 See id. at 240 tbl.5. 
99 Id. at 226.  
100 Snyder & Hughes, supra note 35, at 375 tbl.6. 
101 See Hughes & Snyder, supra note 96, at 240 tbl.5. 
102 Snyder & Hughes, supra note 35, at 375 tbl.6. 
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favored losing plaintiffs with few assets, who couldn’t afford to 
pay the winning defendants’ attorneys’ fees.103  But, Hughes and 
Snyder surmise, loser pays actually encouraged plaintiffs with 
assets to drop weak cases early in order to avoid having to pay a 
fee award.104
PART V: PRESERVING ACCESS THROUGH 
INSURANCE 
  Be that as it may, at least some percentage of 
plaintiffs proved judgment-proof, preventing winning 
defendants from collecting their fees and blunting the incentive 
effects of the law.  In view of Florida’s experience, those 
advocating loser pays rules should take into account the 
problem of judgment-proof plaintiffs and consider insurance or 
other devices to ensure that plaintiffs without assets did not stop 
the rule from functioning. 
As we have seen, loser pays rule can be expected to reduce 
the volume of nuisance litigation and more fully compensate 
plaintiffs who win cases.  These gains would come at an 
unacceptable price, though, if the new rule discouraged injured 
people of little means from seeking justice out of fear that they 
might be liable for a ruinous fee award.  Proponents of loser 
pays reforms must explain how their proposals will preserve 
functional access to justice for poor and middle-income 
plaintiffs. 
Loser pays countries usually preserve access by making 
available a combination of public- and union-funded legal aid 
programs and legal expenses insurance, all of which indemnify 
participating plaintiffs for attorneys’ fees in the event of a 
                                                   
103 Florida law formally exempted litigants from liability for their 
opponent’s attorneys’ fees if they were unable to pay them.  FLA. STAT. § 768.56 
(1980) (“[A]ttorney’s fees shall not be awarded against a party who is insolvent 
or poverty-stricken.”), repealed by ch. 85-175, 1985 Fla. Laws 1225.  See Snyder 
& Hughes, supra note 35, at 356 (noting that this provision seldom benefited 
defendants). 
104 See Snyder & Hughes, supra note 35, at 377-78. Their observation is 
consistent with the finding in Alaska that its loser pays rule reduces low-merit 
filings by middle-class, but not poor, litigants.  See DI PIETRO ET AL., supra note 
75, at 102. 
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courtroom loss.105  Because union membership in the United 
States has declined significantly in recent decades,106 and 
because public legal aid in the United States is not funded 
generously enough to provide legal services to all qualified 
applicants,107
Legal expenses insurance (LEI) takes two common forms in 
loser pays jurisdictions.  The first is traditional LEI, for which a 
premium is charged every month and which covers any legal 
expenses of either a future plaintiff or a future defendant that 
might arise as the result of events, such as an accident, that 
occur after the policy is in place.  These traditional policies pay 
the legal expenses of suits initiated by the covered party, 
assuming that the insurance company deems the suit in 
question to have a solid basis.
 legal expenses insurance is the most likely of these 
mechanisms to play the role of ensuring access to U.S. courts if a 
loser pays rule is widely adopted. 
108
                                                   
105 See Neil Rickman, Paul Fenn & Alastair Gray, The Reform of Legal Aid 
in England and Wales, 20 FISCAL STUD. 261, 262 (1999). 
 
 
106 Gerald Mayer, Union Membership Trends in the United States 10 
(2004), available at  
http://digitalcommons.ilr.cornell.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1176&contex
t=key_workplace&sei-
redir=1#search="Gerald+Mayer+Union+Membership+Trends". 
 
107 LEGAL SERVICES CORP., DOCUMENTING THE JUSTICE GAP IN 
AMERICA: THE CURRENT UNMET CIVIL LEGAL NEEDS OF LOW-INCOME 
AMERICANS 5 (2005), available at  
http://www.lsc.gov/press/documents/LSC%20Justice%20Gap_FINAL_1001.p
df. 
 
108 Anthony Heyes, Neil Rickman & Dionisia Tzavara, 24 INT’L REV. L. & 
ECON.,107, 108 (2004) (“In principle, the effects of LEI are manifold and will 
include the signaling associated with an insurer being willing to allow a 
policyholder to pursue a case (this will usually be done after a merits test) . . . .”). 
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The second type of LEI is “after-the-event” (ATE) legal 
expenses insurance, which a party claiming injury can purchase 
at the time he files a lawsuit and which will relieve him of the 
obligation to pay the defendant’s attorneys’ fees out of pocket if 
his suit is unsuccessful.109  ATE premiums can be advanced by 
the plaintiff’s lawyer as costs, or they can take the form of a 
percentage stake in any recovery; either way, an upfront 
contribution by the plaintiff, particularly one of limited means, 
is not required. 110  In some jurisdictions, the ATE premiums 
that a winning plaintiff has paid can be recovered from a losing 
defendant.111
Both types of litigation insurance—traditional LEI and ATE—
protect the viability of strong cases while discouraging weak 
ones by denying coverage or charging higher rates.  Insurance 
coverage spreads the cost of losing a good case across many 
legitimate claimants, while careful underwriting keeps poor 
cases from being filed. 
 
Some will object to the notion of making insurance 
companies, in effect, the courts’ gatekeepers.  American 
plaintiffs’ lawyers already screen potential cases as to merit and 
decline to handle at least half of prospective claims that they are 
offered.112  In a competitive insurance market, plaintiff’s lawyers 
could shop their cases among insurers.  And nothing need 
prevent a plaintiff’s lawyer herself from assuming the risk of 
paying a defendant’s legal fees—that is, accepting self-insurance, 
in effect, as an additional contingent cost of taking a case.113
                                                   
109 Kritzer, supra note 58. 
  If a 
110 See, e.g., After the Event Products and Services, LEGAL EX, 
http://www.legalexplus.com/after-the-event-insurance.asp (last visited May 11, 
2011) (charging no premium until successful conclusion of case). 
111 See John Peysner, A Revolution by Degrees: From Costs to Financing 
and the End of the Indemnity Principle, WEB J. OF CURRENT LEGAL ISSUES 
(2001), http://webjcli.ncl.ac.uk/2001/issue1/peysner1.html. 
112 See KRITZER, supra note 5, at 71. 
113 Legal ethics requirements in some jurisdictions might have to be 
modified to enable a plaintiff’s attorney to assume a client’s risk of bearing legal 
expenses. 
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claim were denied both ATE coverage and self-insurance by a 
plaintiff’s attorney, it would be because it was highly unlikely to 
succeed,114
The experience of foreign countries suggests that a market 
for legal expenses insurance could develop rather easily in the 
United States.  Traditional LEI is particularly popular in 
Germany, where about 42% of all households have policies.
 making it the very type of claim that loser pays was 
designed to discourage. 
115  
By law, it is a stand-alone product there, but it can be offered as 
an add-on to homeowner’s insurance or auto insurance in other 
loser pays countries, as it usually is in England.116
The cost of traditional LEI is generally modest.
 
117  Some 
traditional LEI policies cover the hourly fees that the plaintiff 
owes his attorney (unless, of course, the losing defendant pays 
them), eliminating the need to hire attorneys on a contingent 
basis.  Such policies also insure plaintiffs against the risk of 
having to pay an adverse fee award, at least up to some stated 
limit.118
                                                   
114 Certain classes of cases, while unlikely to succeed, might nevertheless 
have some social merit.  Fortunately, the most obvious of these, federal 
constitutional claims, are set out by separate statute and would be exempted 
from a general loser pays rule.  Other exceptions could be created as 
appropriate. 
  If American jurisdictions adopted loser pays, 
traditional LEI policies would have a market among middle-
income Americans who have assets to protect and commonly 
115 Matthias Kilian, Alternatives to Public Provision: The Role of Legal 
Expenses Insurance in Broadening Access to Justice: The German Experience, 
30 J.L. & SOC’Y 31, 38 (2003).  
116 Id. at 39. 
117 A white paper from the Office of the Lord High Chancellor observes: 
“The premiums, often between £4 and £20, are so small that most people do 
not realize they have cover in the event that they need to go to law.”  LORD HIGH 
CHANCELLOR, MODERNISING JUSTICE 22 §2.35 (1998). 
118 See Jon Robins, Can the Insurance Industry Plug the Justice Gap?, 
LEGAL ACTION, Jan. 2009, at 10, available at  
http://www.lag.org.uk/files/92761/FileName/January_LA_10_11.
pdf. 
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carry other forms of insurance, such as life insurance, 
homeowner’s insurance, and traditional liability insurance. 
Recent policy changes in England and Wales have shown 
that insurers can quickly respond to them by providing needed 
products.  In 1990, Parliament passed a measure legalizing 
“conditional fee agreements” (CFAs) for personal injury claims 
and certain other proceedings.119  Under a CFA, a client need 
pay his lawyer nothing if his case is lost but must pay a “success 
fee” (in addition to regular fees recovered from the defendant) if 
the case is won.120  In 1998, the government extended the 
measure to allow CFA agreements in all civil cases except those 
involving family law.121
At the same time, Parliament phased out civil legal aid 
entirely for personal injury plaintiffs and made other forms of 
aid available to only a small minority of the population.
 
122
These twin reforms—liberalizing CFAs and cutting legal aid—
effectively privatized personal injury litigation in England and 
Wales.  Lawyers and insurers, rather than taxpayers, are now 
underwriting litigation risk for plaintiffs, and a variety of ATE 
policies have been introduced by more than half a dozen 
insurance companies, which advertise ATE policies online;
  The 
former eligibility of a majority may have had the effect of 
artificially stunting the market for legal expenses insurance. 
123
                                                   
119 Adrian Walters & John Peysner, Event-Triggered Financing of Civil 
Claims: Lawyers, Insurers and the Common Law, 8 NOTTINGHAM L.J. 1, 8 
(1999). 
 at 
120 LORD HIGH CHANCELLOR, supra note 117, at 24 §2.42.  
121 Id. at 24 §2.43.  
122 See Rickman, Fenn & Gray, supra note 105, at 275-76. 
123 See, e.g., After the Event Insurance (ATE Insurance), THE JUDGE, 
http://www.thejudge.co.uk/after-the-event-insurance (last visited Apr. 5, 2011); 
After the Event Insurance & Litigation Funding – ATE Insurance, 1ST CLASS 
LEGAL, http://www.ateinsurance.com (last visited May 12, 2011); After the 
Event Insurance (ATE), Legal Expenses Insurance, Negligence and Litigation, 
LAWASSIST, http://www.lawassist.co.uk (last visited Apr. 5, 2011); LEGAL EX, 
supra note 110; Legal & Protection Services, HSBC INSURANCE (Aug. 6, 2007),  
http://web.archive.org/web/20070806021811/http://www.insurancebrokers.h
sbc.com/hsbc/legal_protection (accessed by searching for 
Insurancebrokers.hsbc.com/hsbc/legal_protection in the Internet Archive 
index); Legal Expenses, FIRSTASSIST, http://www.legalexpenses.co.uk/ (last 
Spring 2011 Rutgers Journal of Law & Public Policy Vol 8:3 
 
607 
least two post applications, as well, online.124  They are four to 
six pages in length and are filled out by plaintiffs’ attorneys.  The 
premium, which may be as low as £85 and is generally “£100 or 
more,” can be advanced by the applicant’s lawyer.125  If the 
plaintiff prevails, he can also recover from the defendant the 
premiums he has paid.126  At least some advertised ATE policies 
do not charge the premium until the case settles or until a 
verdict has been rendered in the plaintiff’s favor.127
In 2003, ATE constituted about 29% of the larger LEI 
market in Britain and collected some £110 million in 
premiums.
 
128  A British trade publication recently estimated that 
ATE insurance is now purchased for three in four civil lawsuits 
filed under conditional fee agreements.129
                                                                                                                        
visited April 5, 2011); Litigation Insurance, STIRLING LEGAL SERVICES (Feb. 10, 
2008), 
http://web.archive.org/web/20080210054758/http://www.stirlinglegal.com/li
tigation_insurance.php (accessed by searching for StirlingLegal.com in the 
Internet Archive index); No Win No Fee Injury Compensation Specialists, 
ACCIDENT LINE, http://www.accidentlinedirect.co.uk/Pages/Home.aspx (last 
visited April 5, 2011). 
  The rapid growth of 
the ATE insurance market in England and Wales should help 
assure observers of the American legal scene that legal expenses 
insurance can effectively preserve access to justice in loser pays 
jurisdictions. 
124 See 1ST CLASS LEGAL, supra note 123; THE JUDGE, supra note 123. 
125 See Rickman, Fenn & Gray, supra note 105, at 277. 
126 Yue Qiao, Legal-Expenses Insurance and Settlement, 1 ASIAN J. L. & 
ECON., no. 1, 2010, at 13, available at  
http://www.bepress.com/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1003&context=ajle. 
127 See, e.g., LEGAL EX, supra note 123. 
128 OFFICE OF FAIR TRADING, THE UK LIABILITY INSURANCE MARKET: A 
FOLLOW-UP TO THE OFT’S 2003 MARKET STUDY 34 §5.8 (2005), available at 
http://www.oft.gov.uk/shared_oft/reports/financial_products/oft802.pdf. 
129 Katy Dowell, False Economy, THE LAWYER (Feb. 18, 2008), 
http://www.thelawyer.com/false-economy/131305.article.  
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PART VI: IMPLEMENTATION GUIDELINES 
The Alaska and Florida experiences—and the light they shed 
on the theoretical literature on fee shifting—suggest that future 
loser pays reforms should incorporate the following three 
features. 
First, the size and percentage of the fee shifted must be large 
enough to affect the behavior of potential litigants.  Alaska’s 
loser pays rule allows prevailing defendants to be reimbursed 
only 20% to 30% of their actual legal expenditures, an amount 
too low to adequately influence a plaintiff’s decision about 
whether to file suit. 
Second, loser pays works best if defendants can recover their 
fees in cases involving plaintiffs with few personal assets.  In 
many nations with loser pays rules, litigation insurance is 
available to plaintiffs at a reasonable price.  The United States 
should require plaintiffs to purchase insurance, and it should 
permit plaintiff’s lawyers to advance insurance premiums, as 
they currently do other litigation costs, in order to preserve 
access to the courts. 
Finally, loser pays reforms should be designed to minimize 
any possible increases in per-case costs and any possible 
negative effect settlement rates.  In order to accomplish this, 
loser pays should be accompanied by a modified offer-of-
judgment rule (similar to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 68) 
that applies to both plaintiffs and defendants.  Offer-of-
judgment rules impose court costs on plaintiffs who pass up a 
settlement offer in favor of obtaining a judgment that turns out 
to be no more generous.  If such rules were extended to include 
attorneys’ fees, they would encourage timely settlement of 
claims. 
PART VII: A PROPOSAL FOR REFORM 
The following proposal is designed to bring the benefits of 
loser pays to both the state and federal justice systems.  It 
includes a modified offer-of-judgment device.  It is designed to 
compensate winning litigants more fully and reduce the number 
of abusive lawsuits, while preserving access to justice for poor 
and middle-income litigants with strong claims.  It should also 
limit any increases in litigation expenditures and encourage the 
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parties to make reasonable settlement offers so as to limit their 
potential liability for attorneys’ fees.  A formal mathematical 
model of this proposal is included in an appendix to this article 
for technical readers. 
PROPOSAL 
 
The non-prevailing party in any civil case in which money 
damages are sought shall indemnify the prevailing party for the 
costs of litigation and reasonable attorneys’ fees.  Fees awarded 
shall be the lesser of 1) actual fees, or 2) 30% of the difference 
between the final judgment and the non-prevailing party’s last 
written offer of settlement tendered within sixty days of the date 
that the initial complaint was filed in the trial court. 
 
DETERMINING THE PREVAILING PARTY: The plaintiff is 
the prevailing party if it obtains an order for a net total 
judgment amount (including all substantive claims and 
counterclaims and excluding costs) in excess of the defendant’s 
last written offer of settlement tendered within sixty days of the 
date that the initial complaint was filed in the trial court.  
Otherwise, the defendant will be deemed the prevailing party. 
 
ABILITY TO PAY: Within ninety days of the date that the 
initial complaint is filed in the trial court, the plaintiff shall file 
proof that assets are available to pay a judgment awarding costs.  
Such proof may be a litigation insurance policy.  The plaintiff’s 
attorney may advance the premium for such a policy, and the 
plaintiff may recover the premium as costs if the plaintiff is the 
prevailing party.  If the plaintiff does not file such proof, the 
complaint will be dismissed without prejudice. 
 
VOLUNTARY DISMISSAL: A plaintiff will be liable for costs 
as a non-prevailing party under this section if it moves to 
withdraw a lawsuit more than ninety days after the initial 
complaint was filed. 
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MAINTENANCE AND CHAMPERTY: The provision of 
litigation insurance in accordance with other applicable law 
shall not be deemed maintenance or champerty. 
 
As previously discussed, greater compliance with the law, 
more complete compensation for victims, fewer transaction 
costs, and more equitable distribution of those transaction costs 
that cannot be avoided are four widely acceptable desiderata of 
legal procedural reform.130
 
  This loser pays proposal is designed 
to promote them all.  First, the proposed reform will promote 
compliance with legal standards of care by making it cheaper for 
individuals and businesses to take appropriate safety 
precautions, and by increasing their legal liability when they fail 
to do so.  Because potential defendants will be motivated to 
invest more resources to ensure public safety, both injuries and 
litigation should decrease.  Businesses and individuals will also, 
for the same reasons, be more motivated to honor their 
contractual obligations. 
Second, this rule should better compensate plaintiffs with 
strong cases, whether they succeed at trial or negotiate a 
settlement armed with the enhanced bargaining power of a 
likely fee award.  Legal expenses insurance will play a critical 
role by preserving access to justice for plaintiffs of modest 
means who have decent legal claims.  The proposed reform 
includes a provision protecting insurance providers from 
liability under traditional common-law doctrines of 
maintenance and champerty, which have traditionally barred 
some forms of litigation financing in the United States.131
 
  
Reformers in specific jurisdictions should work directly with 
insurance regulators to remove any other existing barriers to the 
rapid development of this important market. 
                                                   
130 See supra, Part I.  
131 Champerty is: “A bargain between a stranger and a party to a lawsuit by 
which the stranger pursues the party’s claim in consideration of receiving part 
of any judgment proceeds; it is one type of ‘maintenance,’ the more general term 
which refers to maintaining, supporting, or promoting another person’s 
litigation.” BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 231 (6th ed. 1990).  
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Third, the proposed reform will lower the overall cost of the 
civil justice system by reducing the number of low-merit 
lawsuits filed.  Nuisance lawyers would face lower settlement 
offers in response to weak claims, giving them an incentive to 
file small, meritorious suits instead or shift to other specialties 
or professions.  The proposed reform’s offer-of-judgment 
feature, limiting fee-awards to an amount equal to 30% of the 
difference between the relevant settlement offer of the losing 
party and the amount recovered at trial, is designed to contain 
per-case costs by promoting early settlement.  Parties will want 
to make their settlement offers as reasonable as possible, 
because a party’s settlement offer limits its liability for 
attorneys’ fees in the event of a loss at trial.  The offer-based fee 
cap will also discourage litigation spending that is out of 
proportion to the actual stakes of the case. 
Finally, this proposal will distribute the costs associated with 
the civil justice system more equitably.  Negligent defendants 
will pay a greater share of these costs than they now do, as will 
nuisance lawyers and their clients, and the costs associated with 
arguable cases will be spread more broadly among all payers of 
litigation insurance premiums, all defendants, and all taxpayers. 
The United States pays a high price for a system of justice 
that encourages abusive litigation, but it need not continue to do 
so.  Thoughtful reforms in state and federal law can replace the 
American rule for attorneys’ fees with a loser pays system 
without barring the courthouse door to plaintiffs with modest 
means but legitimate grievances.  England’s recent quasi-
privatization of civil justice demonstrates that markets for 
litigation insurance can develop rapidly in response to legal 
reforms; and reasonable limits to the parties’ exposure to 
liability for fees, if they are incorporated into an offer-of-
judgment mechanism, can promote early and efficient 
settlement. 
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APPENDIX: A FORMAL MODEL OF A LOSER PAYS 
REFORM PROPOSAL132
 
 
Let j (nonnegative) represent the size of the judgment for the 
plaintiff if the lawsuit proceeds to trial. Let P(·) represent the 
probability distribution of trial outcomes if the lawsuit does not 
settle. This means that P(ĵ) represents the probability that the 
net total judgment for the plaintiff at trial will be less than ĵ. Let 
J represent the expected value of the judgment if the lawsuit 
goes to trial: J = ∫jdP(j) . Let CΠ and CΔ represent the plaintiff’s 
and defendant’s total attorneys’ fees and costs, respectively. Let 
Φ represent the plaintiff’s special settlement offer, and let Ω 
represent the defendant’s special settlement offer. For the sake 
of simplicity, assume for the moment that: 1) both parties have 
the same beliefs about P(·); 2) CΠ > .3(JΩ≤j – Ω); AND 3) CΔ > 
.3(Φ – Jj< Ω). 
 
The plaintiff’s expected gain at trial is: 
UΠ ≡ J – [CΠ – .3(JΩ≤j – Ω)] – P(Ω)[CΠ + .3(Φ – Jj< Ω)] 
 
The defendant’s expected loss at trial is: 
UΔ ≡ J +  [CΔ – .3(Φ – Jj< Ω)] – [1 – P(Ω)] [CΔ + .3(JΩ≤j – Ω)] 
 
UΠ is decreasing in Φ, which should encourage the plaintiff 
to make a modest settlement offer. UΠ is also decreasing in CΠ, 
meaning that the plaintiff has an incentive to control its 
litigation costs. Because it is strictly true that CΠ ≥ [CΠ – .3(JΩ≤j 
– Ω)], this proposal appears to reduce the incentive that the 
plaintiff has to control its costs. However, in cases in which [CΠ 
– .3(JΩ≤j – Ω)] ≥ 0  (as will be true in most cases in which 
expenditures are not already unusually low), the plaintiff’s 
marginal additional expenditures will be internalized, 
containing total trial expenditures. Notice also that UΠ increases 
                                                   
132 This model is adapted from a model suggested by Tai-Yeong Chung, 
Settlement of Litigation under Rule 68: An Economic Analysis, 25 J. LEGAL 
STUD. 261 (1996). To keep the math as simple as possible, all actors are assumed 
to be risk-neutral here, but the directional effects are the same if one or both 
parties are assumed to be risk-averse. 
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in J and decreases in P(Ω), which suggests that the proposal will 
discourage low-merit lawsuits. 
 
UΔ is decreasing in Ω, which should encourage the defendant 
to lower its expected trial costs by making a reasonably generous 
settlement offer. UΔ is increasing in CΔ, and, as in the plaintiff’s 
case, the defendant’s marginal expenditure decisions should not 
be affected by partial indemnity under this loser pays rule 
(relative to the current American rule) in cases in which [CΔ – 
.3(Φ – Jj< Ω)] ≥ 0. 
 
